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in the Nineteenth Century: A Comparative Approach1
1. Introduction
This essay will compare the patterns of collective physical violence in the United
States and in Latin America during the 19th century. Its main purpose is to identify the
differences in the practice of collective violence despite similar developments on the two
continents and to uncover the underlying reasons for these distinctions. The comparison
is not based on definitive theoretical assumptions or hypotheses, and therefore it will
neither be systematic nor present “certified” results. Rather we select specific issues
while neglecting others. Nowadays adolescents from Central America, for example, after
living in the United States for several years as illegal immigrants take their “notions of
street gangs” back to their countries of origin2. We do not discuss this transfer of beha-
vior or structures, which certainly could be included in a comparison, but instead we
focus on distinguishing aspects and primarily on collective –not on individual– acts of
violence, analyzing them in their specific historical contexts rather than in a normative
framework of accepted and deviant behavior. In accordance with the sociologist Hein-
rich Popitz (1992: 48) we understand violence as an exercise of power which leads to
physically injuring other persons, recognizing that this general definition includes
various and quite distinct forms of violence.
The following considerations provide some guidelines for this comparison. In con-
trast to the traditional constitutional law approach to state formation we find societies in
the United States as well as in parts of Latin America which in comparison to the state
were clearly excessively armed in the 19th and 20th centuries. In both cases –with per-
haps the exception of Chile– in the 19th century, the state’s monopoly of violence was
not, or only partly, enforced or the state was unable, or able only in exceptional cases, to
keep effectively social actors from using physical violence high-handedly and arbitrarily.
However, there were also significant differences.
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In the United States there existed a tradition of popular approval for the use of force
nurtured by several sources: the frontier experience; the institution of slavery, not only in
the Southern colonies and states but also in the North until the early 19th century; the
emergence of local autonomy and colonial conflict with the imperial center of power in
London; finally also by the Old Testament doctrine of retribution. Settlers usually had to
be prepared to contribute personally and materially to protecting the frontier in the
ongoing process of pushing back the indigenous population. Participating in the border
guard and militia was common given the absence of military protection by the imperial
power –merely some 800 English soldiers were stationed on the North American conti-
nent in the mid-18th century (Shy 1965: 34 ff.)– although the modest deployment of troops
may also reflect the absence of major conflict during this period. Yet as a matter of 
principle the colonies also relied on the Rangers and the militia for their own security,
even if guns and equipment were often deficient (Bellesiles 2000). In the slave economy
of the South slaveowners were determined to fully control and discipline the slave popu-
lation, devising increasingly complex law codes in the nineteenth century which entitled
them as well as privately organized local police patrols to use force. Individual applica-
tion of violence and punishment as a strategy of intimidation was also generally recogni-
zed as a legitimate means of defending and restoring one’s personal and family’s honor
in the antebellum South (Wyatt-Brown 1982, Gastil 1989). The tradition of autonomous
self-rule was established by the need to maintain order on the local level given the absen-
ce or inadequacy of English authorities in the colonies’ extensive backcountry and on the
frontier. This sense of administrative autonomy was strengthened in the course of the
escalating tensions between the colonies and the English government from the end of the
French and Indian War (1756-1763) until the onset of the War of Independence, engrain-
ing in the country’s political culture a tradition of persistent distrust of an all-powerful
federal state. When confronted with the need to equip the new government with viable
mechanisms of power and authority, Federalists as well as many Republicans did favor a
standing army. On the other hand the notion that it was the citizen’s duty to keep a watch-
ful eye on the federal government in order to prevent it from abusing its power was invo-
ked as well. Thus militant groups nowadays defend the right to the private ownership of
firearms, supposedly guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the Constitution, arguing
that it is also meant to protect the social order against the potential abuse of power by the
federal government itself (Wills 1995).
Nowadays only in such exceptional cases is the state’s prerogative to use force jeo-
pardized and violence directed against the government itself. Influenced by the Old Tes-
tament doctrine of retribution (“an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”) as propagated
by fundamentalist denominations originating in folk revivalist traditions, a majority of
the American public continues to support the death penalty. Yet today it sees its execu-
tion as exclusively within the state’s authority; racist motivated lynchings by illegal
mobs frequently occurring in the segregated South as late as the 1940s, are no longer
tolerated and fortunately gone. Instead institutionalized mechanisms of criticism, like the
right to free speech, assembly and religion as guaranteed in the First Amendment to the
Constitution, serve as an important safety valve by legitimating political and social pro-
test, thereby often helping to diffuse it. This in turn results in a high degree of moral sup-
port to the state’s claim that it has the exclusive right to use force, which has been dele-
gated to it by consent and therefore is seen as legitimate.
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In Latin America, on the other hand, the attitude toward violence has been charged
with increasingly negative connotations both in the public political sphere and probably
among large segments of the population as well since about the second half of the 19th
century, after a period of relative approval among the political elites in the early 19th cen-
tury during the movement for independence and its accompanying revolutionary rheto-
ric. Thus we roughly see the opposite tendency to developments in the United States.
Today this tradition of non-state violence, or the excesses of illegal violence produced by
the state itself or by paramilitary forces tolerated by the state, has led to the resigned
view in Colombia, Peru, and El Salvador that these countries are plagued by endemic
“cultures of violence”3. Today in Latin America, violence is seen less as an instrument of
power politics to be used rationally or to enforce peace and order than as a perpetual fac-
tor of social and political reality, whose menacing presence could not yet be controlled
adequately. Maybe this perspective still reflects Iberian-Catholic concepts of violence,
and ultimately an understanding of mankind as being condemned by the Fall to exert or
suffer violence, whereas in the United States notions of violence have prevailed which
are more closely related with the idea of progress or more “secularized” notions of
power. It is noteworthy, however, that reports from Latin American regions especially
afflicted with violence, like the town of Medellín in Colombia, show that even today
youth gangs exploit religious beliefs, e.g. the symbolic approval of violence by a permis-
sive female godlike figure, the Holy Virgin, to both legitimize and repent their acts of
violence (Salazar 1992: 118 f.). Anyway the negative concept of violence reflects Latin
America’s historical experiences from the early 19th century to the excesses of so-called
state terrorist violence in the most recent past. 
This does not mean, however, that violence in Latin America is a “traditional” pheno-
menon. Quite on the contrary we find new actors or the highest rates of violence in con-
temporary Latin American societies for clearly economic reasons –not because cultural
traditions or ritual prescriptions call for the use of violence in order to symbolically repro-
duce a community. Colombia’s colonization areas resp. drug economies nowadays are an
especially obvious example of this combination of violence and commodity economy.
The average level of violence in that country is significantly higher than in the United Sta-
tes. A study published by the “Inter-American Development Bank” in August 1999 argued
that the rate of violence as measured by various indicators (crime and homicide rates, los-
ses to the national economy by the economic cost of violence) is five times that of the rest
of the world. In Colombia the economic causes of violence became more significant when
beginning around 1970 “illegal” markets mushroomed in regions and colonization areas
beyond the state’s control. If we assume certain continuities of development, we find that
state and private protagonists in Colombia (as in other Latin American countries) were on
a par since the beginning of the 19th century and that they were not clearly separated from
each other. A kind of segmented organization of violence prevailed to which the excesses
of Colombian federalism contributed. The participation of a substantial part of the popula-
tion in violent conflicts also supported a broad diffusion of violence. Theories of violence
tell us that violent action happens when strong opponents face each other on a roughly
equal footing, i.e. in a “symmetrical” relationship, not when one side is clearly superior
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(Elias 1977). Colombia seems to serve as empirical evidence for the theory’s validity. Al-
though the collapse of the state in Colombia which had been announced by social scien-
tists in 1980 did not happen, this danger is still not averted. In 1999 the Colombian
government officially renounced the claim of control over the whole country, and in a
treaty it recognized the FARC guerilla as administrator of part of the state’s territory. 
These preliminary thoughts direct our comparative endeavor to the “long” 19th cen-
tury, which lasted until about 1915 in the United States, and until about 1930 in the large
Latin American countries. For it was in the 19th century that the state as the central au-
thority for the organization of violence acquired “firm” outlines both in the United States
and in Latin America as a result of independence movements, and this development had
lasting repercussions on the structure of violence. Focussing on this period, we single out
three topics for the comparison discussing their interrelationship in the following order:
Regions characterized by the absence of legal authority, protagonists of violence, and the
institution building process.
2. “Empty Spaces”: The Absence of Legal Authority on the Frontier
Today social spaces in which legal institutions and authorities are absent are rather
symptomatic of urban environments both in the United States and in Latin America,
whereas in the 19th century they were predominantly rural phenomena. Many historians
point out specifically the role of the frontiers as typical social and cultural learning
grounds both of violence and order: Since the state could not guarantee the maintenance
of order on the frontiers, where the threat of violence was especially great because of
ethnic and racial conflict, people, they argue, had to help themselves and take the execu-
tion of law in their own hands. Thus separate “cultures of violence” emerged. This inter-
pretation, however; has been challenged by other historians who argue that in the case of
the United States the level of violence was markedly higher in eastern towns and cities or
in the Southern States during the period of Reconstruction, than on the western fron-
tiers4. In addition there are substantially divergent historical evaluations of the frontier in
North and South America. Historians of the U.S. frontier traditionally have emphasized
its dynamic character and its enormous potential for economic and demographic growth.
For these reasons the frontier was systematically developed and finally integrated politi-
cally into the national territory. In Latin America on the other hand frontiers are often
described as borderlands on the margins of western civilization and without a clear-cut
potential for development. Historians emphasize the importance which illegal economies
or openly violent forms of economic management (kidnapping, blackmailing, gang orga-
nized contraband, etc.) could assume on the frontier. We can therefore ask if “markets of
violence” developed on particular frontiers in Latin America in the early 19th century.
The notion of a market of violence was developed for analyzing the commercialization
of violence in contemporary African societies. In this view markets of violence emerge
when commercial interests enter areas susceptible to the exercise of violence, where firm
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state-imposed limits for the use of violence are lacking. Using violence then becomes the
most important form of economic management, whether by violently controlling and
exploiting the resources and the markets, or by transforming the exercise of violence into
a good in and of itself (Elwert 1997, François/Rufin 1996). Markets of violence erode
the state order or assume its disintegration. In the early 19th century rudimentary “mar-
kets of violence” that fostered inter-ethnic alliances resp. networks between Indian caci-
ques and Spanish-Creole or Mestizo merchants or militia officers apparently existed
temporarily in the Southern La Plata region or in parts of Northern Mexico where their
development was fostered by commercial scalp hunts (Riekenberg 2000).
When comparing the frontiers in Latin America and the United States, one has to
take into account that they usually showed significant structural differences. It is there-
fore questionable anyway from the outset to draw simple parallels. But for this very reason
the territories which Mexico surrendered to the United States in the mid-19th century are
worth looking at for comparative purposes. For they can serve as a telling example of
changes which, as a result of changes of the political system, did, or did not, happen on
the frontiers beyond the indolent structures of traditional social and cultural organiza-
tion. This approach allows for better evaluating the impact of the state’s structure on
frontier development. Jill Mocho’s study of the development of crime and justice in New
Mexico before and after 1848 is an example for such an approach. She argues that it was
only the North American state which secured a firmer hold over controlling violence on
the frontier, whereas the Spanish colonial government resp. the state of Mexico had fai-
led to do so (Mocho 1997: 9 f., 180 f.). Mocho attributes this difference primarily to the
fact that the Mexican judges were embedded in the local power networks and had little
backing from state authorities. Furthermore other state institutions were absent which
could have represented the state’s authority, or they were hardly reliable. For long
periods in the 19th century, the government also was unable permanently to station army
units on the so-called military frontiers, like in northern Mexico, because the soldiers
–frequently former gang members– usually deserted.
By comparison violence could be better controlled in the towns, and the Spanish-
Mexican administration of justice was more effective there than in rural communities.
New Orleans is a case in point; legal authorities apparently saw their task less as fighting
crime, however, than as maintaining the social barriers between elites and the lower clas-
ses resp. the slave population (Kerr/Felony 1993). This does not mean, however, that
there was less violence in the towns than on the frontier. In the late 19th century urbani-
zation led to increasing violence in North America’s towns, and similar developments
occurred in Latin America’s urban centers. There not only was crime on the rise but the
anarcho-syndicalist movement made inroads into the laboring class and produced new
forms of collective violence or violent conflicts with state authorities or vigilante groups,
for example the “Liga Patriótica” that was founded in Argentina in 1919 by business
men and supported by police forces and army officers who did not trust the Radical’s
government. Urban spaces and the frontiers thus differed primarily as to the forms of
violence. The relatively greatest correspondence of violence in the towns and on the
frontier probably was that of gangs resp. vigilante groups. 
These observations lead us to ask which impact towns had on frontier development
and on the containment of outlaw violence in frontier areas. Again substantial differen-
ces are obvious: In Latin America there were hardly urban centers (with the possible
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exception of Buenos Aires) which could have had a thorough social and cultural effect
on their rural hinterland. In the United States things were different. There, cities like Chi-
cago and St. Louis influenced the hinterland and had a deep impact on the entire Mid-
west. In addition social elites in these frontier towns maintained close ties with the elites
on the Atlantic seaboard for economic reasons. Thus the San Francisco “Vigilante Com-
mittee”, which was established in 1856 and exerted firm control over violence during
California’s anomic gold rush period, was recruited from Protestant trade interests and
their followers and had close ties to the Northeast and its political and social elites (Sen-
kiewicz 1985: 223 ff.). These connections account for the absence of regional conflicts
between “state” and “frontier”: In the United States towns like Chicago and San Francis-
co helped bridge such conflicts, whereas the Latin American frontiers often represented
regions whose local “elites” distrusted or even rejected the state. This example shows
also that the state’s influence on the frontier cannot simply be measured by the number
and effect of state institutions but that social and cultural processes have to be born in
mind as well, including the “mentalities” of people. However, vigilantes played an ambi-
valent role in this process. They could act in lieu of the state and guarantee law and
order, or they could use their power for their own purposes and thus contribute to the
spread of lawlessness. Likewise, in Latin America local bosses guaranteed order with the
help of client groups but in countless cases this “order” exclusively served the interests
of powerful local clans, and it was often defended even against the law.
In the United States efforts by the federal government to secure its monopoly of vio-
lence during the process of opening up the frontier and integrating new territories into
the Union date back to the period before the Constitution was drafted and adopted. This
early decision followed the increase of territory granted in the Treaty of Paris 1783 which
extended the area of the United States from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississip-
pi River. The new United States government defined the principles for opening up the
new territories north of the Ohio River in the so-called “Northwest Ordinances” of 1784
and 1787, which set precedents for the country’s further expansion after 1803. Earlier
another important fundamental decision in favor of the central government had been
made: The member states had ceded their (partly overlapping) claims for territories west
of the Appalachians to the new central government, and it was this new central (i.e. fede-
ral) government, not the individual member states, which came to own the new territo-
ries and would order and control their use and sale. They were to be subdivided successi-
vely and be accepted as states into the Union “on an equal footing with the original
States in all respects whatever.” (Commager 1963: 131). The Northwest Ordinance of
1787 explicitly mentions the necessary steps for establishing and approving political
institutions which were to be established on the precedent of republican government on
the state and the federal level. The federal government was also given sole authority
(first by the Northwest Ordinance, then by the Constitution of 1787 which became law
of the land in 1789) in the delicate question of how to deal with the indigenous popula-
tion. Responsibility for the federal government’s Indian policy, which initially rested
with the War Department, was transferred to the Department of the Interior at the middle
of the 19th century. In reality it was the army which as the most important federal institu-
tion on the spot assumed the tasks of protecting the frontier and guaranteeing public
order (Tate 1999; Prucha 1953, 1969). In principle, if not in everyday practice, this pre-
cluded the predominance of regional special interests. Territorial and state governments,
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however, did collaborate with the federal government in opening the frontier to settle-
ment. Selective recruiting of European immigrants by new states was encouraged by
relatively liberal immigration and naturalization laws (Schöberl 1990). Steady popula-
tion growth in turn led to the increase of federal, state, and local government institutions,
strengthening the presence of the state in those former frontier areas.
In contrast to the United States, the opening and settlement of frontiers in Latin Ame-
rica did not occur as a result of continuous and extensive immigration from Europe
(plans along those lines during the period of Bourbon reforms were not, or only party,
carried out) but mostly because of sporadic and random internal migrations. There was
no demographic factor of similar weight on the Latin American frontiers as in the North
American case, or only in an inverted, negative sense: e.g. Mexico hardly received Euro-
pean immigrants in the 19th century, and “typical” immigration countries like Argentina
are described for the 1860s as extremely underpopulated (Jones 1994). This meant that
the state often had an insufficient social basis to establish its presence on the frontiers,
i.e. state institutions and the principles or “ideas” represented by the state had no backing
in the loosely structured, dispersed, and sparsely settled frontier societies5. Thus there
were great differences inside Latin America, too: State organization on the frontier was
scattered rather than broken by segmentary forces, as was often the case in the interior,
where the state had to compete with ethnic and local communities or family-based net-
works in the 19th century and often was unable to prevail –or able to prevail only on con-
dition of accepting compromise– against powerful groups which were regionally or
locally bound but nevertheless firmly established and compact (Mallon 1992). This is
also true for the United States as a temporary condition: The Northwest Ordinance of
1787 linked the progressive establishment of governmental authority to a demographic
factor. Initially the federal government was in control of a territory. Upon reaching a
male adult population of 5,000 a legislature was to be elected and a delegate (without the
right to vote) sent to the Congress in Washington. A population of at least 60,000 then
was necessary to apply for statehood6. 
It must be pointed out, however, that contrary to the situation in Latin America the
contest over power on the North American frontier was defined and limited from the
beginning by a process in which the area would be continuously developed toward grea-
ter institutional density and completeness. So long as the state was inadequately repre-
sented by institutions (in this context legal institutions and police authorities are particu-
larly pertinent), pioneers and settlers, applying internalized legal norms of the
communities in the East which they had left, and at times vigilante committees as well,
filled these gaps and took on functions of public order, indictment and enforcement7.
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3. Some Remarks Concerning Agents of Violence
In a recent study David Courtwright has drawn attention to the development of vio-
lence in the United States, in which he, too, primarily deals with the frontier areas during
the 19th century. He essentially sees demographic factors as decisive for the pattern of
violence in the U.S.A., arguing that it was single and transient young men who were the
agents of violence on North America’s frontiers: “As an immigrant society America
experienced a more or less continuous influx of youthful male workers... Insofar as
young, single men are any society’s most troublesome and unruly citizens, America had
a built-in tendency toward violence and disorder” (Courtwright 1996: 3). The typical
environment in which these acts of violence occurred were the mining towns and the
camps of the Union Pacific Railroad. Often violence was triggered by conflicts over
honor and status. This violent behavior of single young men preceded in certain ways
those urban “subcultures” of violence which were described –and defined– by the Chica-
go School of Sociology for the first time in the 1920s. Courtwright’s hypothesis, which
is not new but empirically better documented than before, can be blamed with being
monocausal, because he disregarded other factors of violence. One can also doubt if
family structure based on the nuclear family and individual relationship and anchored in
religious beliefs really contributes to a reduction of violence, as Courtwright claims
(Levinson 1989). Nevertheless Courtwright’s hypothesis is interesting for comparative
purposes, because the type of violent single young men he described was less prevalent
in Latin America in the 19th century where even gangs were sometimes organized as
separate, inter-generational communities in distant areas as occasions arose. Even in
rural areas gangs were not “a predominantly male group but a complete society that
included males and females of all ages” (Merrill 1994: 143), as one author describes the
situation in Northern Mexico for the time around 1780. Since these gangs could be
migrating communities, the possibility cannot be ruled out that in these Latin American
gangs “…forces were unleashed which in Anglo America could be absorbed by the fron-
tier” (Hellwege 1976: 24).
The separation of young violent actors from structures of violence dominated by ties
of kin or clan tended to happen much later in parts of Latin America than in the United
States. While in Mexico such processes apparently occurred in the early 1930s, in
Colombia male youngsters did not begin to organize youth gangs in the towns until the
1950s (Betancourt/García 1991: 120). It seems that the perpetrators of violence in the
19th century in the United States whom Courtwright had in mind were primarily indivi-
duals who united into autonomous groups on a more or less voluntary basis. While they
did not pose a threat to the state’s authority, in Latin America –and in the United States’
Southern states during the period of Reconstruction as well– a type of violent actor pre-
dominated who was integrated into hierarchically organized social systems and perfor-
med acts of violence on the basis of corporate ties, client oriented groups or clan loyalties
and who could therefore be integrated into particularistic local power networks and used
against the state as well. An indicator of this different objective is the fact that violent
actors in ethnic areas and neighborhoods and in the isolated rural communities usually
were part of a kinship network. This by the way could lead to severe generational con-
flict: Repeatedly skirmishes occurred between groups of violent youngsters on the one
hand and the established local socio-religious hierarchy on the other hand in Indian villa-
52 Hartmut Keil/Michael Riekenberg
Rev4-01  22/11/01 12:27  Página 52
ges of the high plains of Central America in the 19th century. The state tried to take advan-
tage of this antagonism by recruiting young men into the militias and defining these mili-
tias as “ladino” institutions, i.e. as an ethnic based institution. By intentionally separating
them from the Indian population, it tried to break up the local and ethnic solidarity of the
highland communities and to increase its own influence in the villages (Carmack 1990). 
Often family ties were extended by ritual forms of kinship relations (compadrazgo)8.
In the early 19th century, when state structures in Latin America were essentially weak-
ened or even disappeared temporarily or completely in isolated or war areas, or in turn,
when old community associations and corporate relationships were successfully destroy-
ed by the state’s liberal policies, whenever it was in a position to do so, these kin and
client oriented networks were able to fill the vacuum of power and function as political
and social power brokers “in [their] own right” (Balmori et al. 1984: 4). People’s loyal-
ties and confidence thereby remained linked to the principle of kinship, not to the com-
paratively abstract “idea” of the state. The organization of violence was often controlled
by powerful family clans –unlike in the United States, where only a few such clan and
family based structures emerged. For example, the gamonalismo originated in the Andes
Mountains, “… a regional tradition of coercive local power... based on both the use of
physical violence and the manipulation of certain racial and aesthetic distinction, gender
and authority” (Poole 1994: 5). Of course, this also included violence directed against
women. Its rates apparently were very high even in colonial times, “...astonishing obser-
vers again and again and filling court archives” (Bernand/Gruzinski 1997: 43). 
An additional observation needs to be made at this point. Although we focus in this
essay on the type of violent actor bound into client relationships in Latin America in the
19th century, this does not mean, of course, that all persons participating in collective acts
of violence not sanctioned by the state were integrated into such a framework of client
commitment, corporate organization or kin networks. It was especially processes of
institution formation that redirected young men’s violent actions. Certainly the begin-
ning professionalization of the military in the late 19th century played a major role. The
goal was to create “new” European-style armies which by the way had not been needed
until then. Thus “[n]ineteenth-century Brazilian history demonstrated little need for such
an army” (McCann 1997: 43). The importance of new “modern” political movements
which emerged at the end of the 19th century has already been pointed out. Even in the
19th century these violent actors were able to leave behind such ties and loyalties in a dif-
ferent social environment, especially in the towns, where the organization of violence
followed other patterns. One example are the various “revolutions” which occurred in
Buenos Aires in the second half of the 19th century (Sabato 2001). Mobilizing the urban
population was especially important in that city since 1852, since its liberal political elite
based its power not primarily on landed property and personal dependence but on its abi-
lity to form a coalition of “freely” available groups among the urban population and to
demonstrate to its political rivals in election campaigns and political conflicts that it had
sufficient numbers of followers. Because of the close, almost seamless transition bet-
ween civil and violent-military behavior –which was partly due to the city’s frontier tradi-
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tion, partly the result of the revolutionary rhetoric and which manifested itself most
clearly in the institution of the militia resp. the “national” guard– these mobilizations
consistently escalated into violent conflict, even in election campaigns. In these political
conflicts violent actors in the urban environment were recruited in part from the city’s
lower classes and later increasingly from immigrant groups, especially Italians (who by
the way officially were not entitled to vote), in part from the “citizens”. Political oppo-
nents generally called them mob or rabble. Although these persons were also mobilized
through client favoritism and promises, they could always shift their loyalties. The
degree of voluntary commitment which entered client relationships was therefore grea-
ter, and it became even more pronounced when political competition in urban environ-
ments increased and populist movements emerged since around 1890 (Sabato 2001).
Although several factors tend to support Courtwright’s hypothesis and suggest differ-
ent types of violent actors in Latin America and the United States, we must make some
qualifications. In the United States regional variations were important. For instance, in
the antebellum South we also find the type of violent actor who was involved in feuds as
a member of a kinship network and who was very similar to his Latin American counter-
part (Brown 1994: 81). For in the South of the United States a patriarchal, semifeudal
slave society emerged with its own traditional code of ethics and values firmly rooted in
the racial divide and often based on kinship ties –in distinct contrast to individual and
egalitarian concepts. The elevated notion of honor, in part derived from English and
Scotch-Irish traditions, in fact a downright “cult of honor” on the one hand and the last-
ing impact of the frontier on the other, especially in the South, where government insti-
tutions were traditionally weak9, meant that the state was regarded as irrelevant when it
came to solving personal conflict: 
Honor thrives in a rural society of face-to-face contact, of a limited number of relations-
hips, of one system of values. Honor depends upon a hierarchical society, where one is defi-
ned by who is above or below him. Honor grows well in a society where the rationalizing
power of the state is weak; an adherence to honor makes the state, at best, irrelevant in set-
tling personal disputes (Ayers 1989: 1483).
In this situation a “culture of violence” (Reed 1982: 141) developed, finding diffe-
rent expressions in the social strata, like fist fights in the lower class or duels in the elite.
Its legacy was carried into the 20th century; statistics show for instance a disproportiona-
tely high rate of capital crimes like homicides and of ownership of firearms in the South
(Reed 1985: 45-55, Lundsgaarde 1989: 1478). Violence was not applied indiscrimina-
tely, however, but was primarily directed against African Americans, first to maintain
slavery, and, after emancipation, to cement segregation; also against other white Souther-
ners in order to defend one’s honor and that of one’s family, or after the Civil War, when
organizations like the Ku Klux Klan were founded, even the honor of the whole South.
In certain cases –like defending the honor of Southern women– killing the suspected
perpetrator was seen as justified and often had no penal consequences10.
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10 Cf. Raymond D. Gastil’s comments on John Sheldon Reed’s analyses: “Reed suggests that the concept
of justifiable homicide is at the heart of the southern tendency to violence. One carries a gun or a knife
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On the other hand we also must make several qualifications for Latin America. This
applies for regional variations as well as for demographic tendencies. In Latin American
towns kinship structures of lower social groups were often deficient; in rural areas
migrant labor contributed to dissolving firm family ties. Thus “lo transitorio”, i.e. the
transient whom Courtwright identifies as contributing to violence in the United States,
was also common in at least parts of Latin America (Cacopardo/ Moreno 1997: 28).
There was a surplus of young and also semi-nomadic men on the frontiers anyway. Thus
this comparison qualifies Courtwright’s hypothesis and leads us away from narrowly
demographic considerations to the social and cultural context of the organization of vio-
lence. To sum up: It was not the demographic and age structure per se that was decisive
for the predominance of a certain type of violent actor. It was rather the social structure
and the cultural context which mattered and which in the Latin American case forced
vagrant young men to accommodate themselves to hierarchically structured social sys-
tems to a much larger degree than in the United States and to pursue their options within
these frameworks. In certain respects it was these conditions which channeled young
men’s willingness to resort to violence. This propensity to violence at the same time was
available to special interests which could become dangerous even for the state. In parti-
cular powerful regional groups were repeatedly able to attack the state itself in the 19th
century. In addition we have to bear in mind that a comparatively strong anti-state tradi-
tion had been existing in Latin America since colonial times, whereby local communities
or ethnic groups or Messianic religious movements, on the basis of village-oriented,
“localocentric” cosmologies (Young 1989: 111) resisted the state’s encroachment on
what they believed to be their “traditional” territories and rights.
In the United States by contrast “traditional” rights, which stood in the way of the
state’s claim of power during the period of rapid westward expansion, were more
strongly tied to the individual, and less to “organic” communities and their demands, i.e.
local violent actors could not avail themselves to the same degree as in Latin America of
an historically evolved territorial support and a strong sense of local identity. Various
factors, like the predominance of individual settlement in the course of westward migra-
tion and the establishment of family farming, favored the individualization of violent
actors in the United States, although individualism as later glorified by Hollywood in the
person of the lone “western hero” taking action in the face of weak, or even absent,
government institutions should be read as an image that barely reflected reality. In the
United States, too, violence was often initiated by groups, not by individuals.
4. Institutions
In the United States long-term and fairly consistent structures of state development
encouraged the activities of violent agents of a more egalitarian bent who either establi-
shed so-called “cultures of violence” of single young men or, conversely, who feeling
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because one might have to use it, and one uses it because the occasion merits it. ... violence ... is often
viewed in a neutral or even laudatory way... For southerners, murder in defense of honor, after sufficient
provocation, is more often tragic rather than simply wrong” (1989: 1475).
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more like “citizens” formed vigilante organizations supposedly to enforce law and order.
Reference has already been made to the mechanisms which were devised early on to
integrate new territories politically. One assumption, i.e. the equal participation of all
citizens, was better realized when political participation was widened to include a greater
part of the population in the 1830s (Ueda 1980, Keil 1988). This expansion was accom-
panied at the same time by a notion of settlement which aimed at individual land hol-
ding. Individuals played an important role indeed in the long-term strategy of recreating
social and political structures which had been tried out in other parts of the country in
order to progressively integrate the new western acquisitions. At least for limited periods
of transition individuals and groups of law-abiding citizens were needed to fill the
vacuum of power by taking initiative and standing up for the law. Typically a myth has
been constructed around the history of westward expansion and the pacification of the
frontier: Despite many obstacles –outlaw gangs terrorizing an intimidated population
(“High Noon”), lynch law being practiced by vigilante committees– state authority is
progressively developed and established, and it finally prevails. In the end the lone hero
becomes the representative of law enforcement (Sheriff), while vigilante citizens’ groups
have to dissolve. Thus ultimately a check is put on individual violence, which had been
tolerated as indispensable for a time, and publicly sanctioned authority replaces indivi-
dual power (Slotkin 1973).
While the “embourgeoisement” of the organization of violence was encouraged by
the impact of individual actors in the United States, such a development hardly occurred
in Latin America. Witness even today the wide ignorance of the systems of law in Latin
American countries, the basic distrust of the police and judiciary as well as the inclina-
tion to arbitrary justice and to taking the law into one’s own hand. Frequently it was
simply the law of the jungle which prevailed, while below this surface of “formal” insti-
tutional instability and discontinuity “informal” institutions, which had emerged from
cultural and traditional habits, showed a remarkable degree of continuity. Not only did
the above-mentioned clan and client violence replace the state’s authority in many cases
but often state institutions themselves were incorporated into this kinship network of
violence and redefined by local rules and conditions. We find reports of the organization
of a “local violence” not or only partially sanctioned by the state as late as in postrevolu-
tionary Mexico in the 1930s (Knight 1997: 114 f.). This meant that the European model,
according to which the organization of violence would be progressively bureaucratized,
did not apply to Latin America, because even in cases in which “the state” controlled
violence in the 19th century, it was often personal interests, like revenge or family feuds,
instead of what we consider as genuine state concerns, which directed the use of violence.
E.g. Lewis Taylor describes how the clashes of interest between the political parties in
Northern Peru, which were settled in small gang wars until 1930, really originated from
old family feuds. The local police was either powerless against such “mutual vendetta
struggles” (Taylor 1980: 45) or was involved in them itself. This is one reason why the
social status of the police was low in Latin America, because many people agreed that
the police primarily served the interests of individual families and powerful groups. In
fact in many cases powerful families determined the police personnel in the rural areas at
least until the 1930s so that formal and informal structures of violence as well as legal,
semi-legal and illegal forms of seizing power were closely interlocked (Nugent 1999).
Because social forms, which were related to the organization of violence, penetrated the
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state and blurred the lines of distinction between the two, it is not surprising that state
institutions like the military, which were extended and “modernized” in the late 19th
century, continued the concepts of violence that were derived from traditional values and
notions of gender utilizing them for their own construction of what Beattie calls a “mili-
tary culture” (1997: 67). Here we encounter the problem of “hybrid” orientation so hotly
debated at the present time in the cultural studies, in this case with respect to the organi-
zation of violence.
In contrast to the United States the movement for independence in Latin America
after 1810 did not transfer sovereignty to the citizens –or did so only in a limited way–
but rather to corporate organizations, the pueblos or towns. Some historians regard this
as an expression of the tradition of Latin America’s authoritarian political culture. They
argue that the establishment of patrimonial, client oriented, inherently authoritarian
structures, of what they call coercive patron-client relations, was supported in the socio-
economic as well as in the political sphere as a result of Spanish and Portuguese colonial
rule (Adelman 1999). Therefore we are confronted with the paradoxical situation in the
19th century that the state made a comparatively sweeping claim for power on the basis
of its traditional self-definition. Thus in Argentina it continued to follow enlightened
absolutistic views in criminal law even in the last third of the 19th century, whereas it
paid no attention to “the citizens’ legal protection” (Duve 2000: 846). On the other hand,
however, it was unable to realize this claim because of the actual power relationships and
the force and influence of segmentary structures, regional interests or local bosses in
Argentine society in the 19th century. In the United States, in comparison, the relation-
ship was rather reverse and the principle of individualism which predominated in the poli-
tical culture prevented authoritarian claims to power from the start. This difference can
be tracked down even in patterns of urban settlement: In Latin America the predominant
view since the early colonial period was that the towns should be laid out around a center
and take shape from there, whereas in the United States efforts were made “to do away
with a public center” (Sennett 1991: 72), as plans for Chicago in 1833 or San Francisco
in 1849 demonstrate.
The police offers a particularly good example of the state’s attitude toward the con-
trol of violence. In the United States the police was organized as a local institution in the
middle of the 19th century. For the remainder of the century it remained socially “inte-
grated” and a “spoils” for the parties and machine politics (Knöbl 1999: 171). The state
had hardly any means to intervene in local affairs and for a long time it was barely able
anyway to contain social conflict, like strikes. The political public also had a comparati-
vely large degree of control over the state’s use of violence. In his analysis of the guerilla
war in Missouri which occurred during the Civil War Michael Fellman has described
how the press prevented the Union army from imposing draconian measures against the
civilian population, like compulsory resettlement (1997: 523 f.). It was only in the last
third of the 19th century when state militias were quickly organized after the railroad strike
in 1877 that the federal states assumed wider authority for repressive measures (Whis-
ker 1999, Cooper 1997). By and large the development of the police in the United States
–in contrast to Latin America– reflects the absence of patrimonial and bureaucratic tradi-
tions, a solid “balance of central and centrifugal resp. federal elements” and a high
degree of the citizens’ participating in political affairs (Knöbl 1999: 171 f.). In Latin
America the collective capacity for participation of wider groups of the population in the
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towns was impeded by ethnic differences, demographic fluctuations, and by the impact
of patriarchic and client ties on political behavior for a long time. It was only social
changes toward the end of the 19th century which led to increased organized social con-
flict in the big Latin American countries and their emerging urban centers and to more
insistent calls for the extension of the state’s repressive powers under the guidance of the
political elites (Arrom 1996).
Although the Latin American (urban) police developed in a direction similar in some
respects to developments in the United States, its structure differed considerably in other
ways. We refer to tendencies toward the militarization of “internal security”, already
apparent in the 19th century, which resulted from the state’s inherent weakness rather
than its strength. This led to a police force which was prone to acts of severe repression
as soon as the opportunity arose, acting without being adequately controlled by the judi-
ciary resp. the public. Since the police had a low social status in Latin American coun-
tries, and its staff was either recruited from marginal social groups or supplemented by
conscription to reach its authorized strength, the state’s principles and “modern”, i.e.
Weberian rationalist views did not gain acceptance in the police forces. Instead corrup-
tion, arbitrary acts, or indifference prevailed, and specific and separate “subcultures”
emerged which practiced their own brands of semilegal violence. It was therefore the
police itself which frequently appeared as the agent of unlawful violence and often
counteracted its “true” function to protect the citizens. This type of indifferent violence
employed by the police in the 19th century which resulted from ignoring the law, how-
ever, was substantially distinct from the terrorist violence which parts of Latin American
police forces practiced during the most recent periods of state despotism in the 1970s
and 1980s. Police reform generally did not occur until the 1920s. Paul Chevigny claims
that the “modernization” of the police forces happened primarily because the “elites”
pushed for better training and control of the police in order to contain unrest and streng-
then the social order (Chevigny 1995: 261). Still in most cases Latin American countries
have not –or have only temporarily– succeeded in transforming the police into a reliable
representative of legal state power. This becomes especially apparent when we look at
the intimate network of police cadres or complete police forces on the one hand and
various forms of vigilantism –for social control or the control of crimes– on the other
hand. This interconnection between the police and semi-illegal or unlawful vigilantism is
by the way different from developments in the United States. For there vigilante commit-
tees usually were
social groups who took the law into their own hand, whereas in South America most vigi-
lante initiatives originated from the state sphere. It was not a coalition of radicalized citizens
but the state security forces who as the agents of state authority, or in informal functions,
were responsible for the majority of vigilante acts of violence in the southern part of the
Americas (Waldmann 1995: 64).
The history of state formation in Europe since 1500 demonstrates that the develop-
ment of the state’s control of violence was closely connected with its capacity for waging
wars. In Europe historically these wars between states were very important for the exten-
sion of tax systems and state bureaucracies, and later for consolidating the resources of
violence in respective institutions. What were the developments in the Americas? In the
United States as well as in Latin America we find a preponderance of inner wars resp.
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civil wars, as against wars between states in the 19th century. However, there were also
substantial differences. In addition to the wars which the United States waged against
Great Britain (1812-1814), Mexico (1846-1848), and Spain (1898), the Civil War in the
United States from 1861 to 1865 also had the dimension of a genuine war between two
nations: About three million soldiers served in this war between the Northern and South-
ern states, of whom 600,000 died. Especially the Union conducted the war on the basis
of an industrializing economy. The Civil War caused a considerable increase of violence,
which continued after the war had ended, particularly in the South where racist motiva-
ted forms of violence as well as violent feuds between family clans increased. However,
the Civil War had considerable consequences for state formation in the United States,
such as the extension of the suffrage to male Afro-Americans in 1870 (Berg 2000)
–which Southern states severely restricted and, as it were, generally withheld after the
end of Reconstruction through various laws and intimidation campaigns. The state not
only basically settled the problem of regionalism, so virulent in Latin America, in favor
of federal, i.e. central authority– although its actual realization would have to await the
1930s and 1960s. The success of the liberal capitalist economy on the basis of free labor
including the former slave states, the resolution of conflicting concepts of the role of the
(federal) state, state intervention in the economy, the introduction of conscription (though
limited to a few years during the Civil War), and the impact on the political public –all
these developments “led to first steps toward transforming the state into the modern
‘leviathan’” (Förster/Nagler 1997: 4). These “first steps” were followed by measures of
pacification after the Civil War when the state employed similar warfare strategies on the
Western frontier which remained contested by Indian tribes; i.e. the army was not only
deployed in the Southern states to introduce the rule of order, but increasingly on the
frontier as well to impose the state’s territorial claims on the Indian reservations which
had been guaranteed a special status until then. According to Chief Justice John Mars-
hall’s interpretation of the Constitution in 1831 and 1832 Indian tribes were regarded as
domestic dependent nations (Hobson 1996). Therefore they had a special relationship to
the federal government and were not subject to individual state authority, legislation and
jurisdiction. In 1871, however, this policy including the recognition of relative territorial
and legal independence was terminated. Using military force, the (federal) state rigo-
rously eliminated the last remaining loophole that challenged its monopoly of violence.
In comparison to the United States most wars which were waged in Latin America
seem to have weakened, instead of strengthened, the state –with perhaps the exception of
Chile, as we indicated before. Several times in the 19th century the Chilean state was able
to decide wars against neighboring states in its favor. In the first place interstate wars
were the exception and inner wars predominated; in the case of Colombia there were no
other but internal wars in the 19th century. These internal wars had the effect of fragmen-
ting the state, however, especially since the military did not always represent the state’s
interests. Frequently the military resembled gang armies, which were organized as
“family based patron-client networks” (Holden 1996: 445) and served local caudillos
resp. “regional warlords” (Depalo 1997: 157, Riekenberg 1999b) rather than the state.
Networking between the gangs and the military also occurred frequently. In Mexico for
instance large gangs dominated the economies in several provinces in the middle of the
19th century, extorting protection money and de facto maintaining order in these “mar-
kets of violence” which they controlled. The state succeeded only gradually –and only
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when more favorable economic conditions developed– in controlling the situation by
“assimilating the gangsters into a police corps” (Vanderwood 1992: 54) in the second
half of the 19th century.
An analysis of these wars reveals that Messianic religious movements could emerge
among ethnic or other groups in rural areas in Latin America in the 19th century who
contributed to the overall extension and escalation of violence by introducing an ethi-
cally legitimated “sacralized” version (Vanderwood 1998). Yet the phenomenon of eth-
nic wars which generally played such an important role for the increase of violence was
lacking in these cases (Riekenberg 2000). Except for several larger military clashes on
the frontiers in Northern and Eastern Mexico (Yucatan) resp. in Cono Sur in the south,
which became more sharply ethnicized in the course of the 19th century and finally cul-
minated in efforts to exterminate the indigenous population through the use of troops,
violent conflicts for ethnic reasons were rare. Completely absent as well were in Latin
America the ethnically motivated national wars so common in Europe –except when we
want to characterize Paraguay’s war against the “triple alliance” as an ethnic interstate
conflict. An important reason for this absence of ethnic wars may be that the Latin Ame-
rican countries did not pursue the ethnicization of “national” identity in the 19th century
because of the diverse origins of their populations, but tried to define their identity by
political categories (citizenship) instead, according to the French model of “political”
nation-building. Nationalist movements including ethnic groups were absent in this
period as well. The movement for independence itself had been organized still by the
representatives of the client oriented Creole “patriotism”, and “modern” nationalist
movements did not emerge in Latin America until the Mexican revolution 1910-1920
resp. until the rise of populist middle class political currents in the towns of the Cono Sur
(Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires) at the beginning of the 20th century. Since the state did
not act as an agent of ethnic violence in the 19th century in Latin America, the ethniciza-
tion of violence by and large did not occur on the same scale that we know from other
regions in the world where the symbiosis between state and ethnicity could (and can)
lead to enormous excesses of ethnic violence.
In the United States national identity was similarly established by political identifi-
cation and citizenship. In the –often violent– contest for access to political and social
participation ethnic, racial, and religious divisions were absolutely important, not only
with respect to groups which were not part of society, like the indigenous population,
who faced repeated attempts at extermination, subjugation, or finally (since 1887) Ame-
ricanization, but also with respect to the Afro-American population to whom citizenship
was finally accorded in 1868 after emancipation, whose rights as citizens, however,
were decisively curtailed by a policy of racial discrimination in the Southern states
(Franklin/Moss 1988: 231-38). Ethnic and racial violence also entered the urban centers
since the 1830s, when the old immigrant elites reacted with nativist slogans and violen-
ce against the new masses of immigrants –e.g. Irish Catholics and German immigrants–
who brought with them alien cultural traditions which were perceived as threatening
cherished WASP (“White Anglo-Saxon Protestant”) values. Repeatedly these immi-
grant groups themselves triggered urban riots –usually against other ethnic and racial
groups, above all against Afro-Americans competing in the labor market– in their
efforts at establishing themselves in, and being recognized by, American society (Jacob-
son 1998).
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5. Conclusions and Further Questions
In the case of the United States the diffusion of violence which we described in the
beginning seems to derive from a basically different relationship between the individual and
society, in certain respects also from individual legal rights vis-à-vis the state. It does not
stem, however, as it does in Latin America in many cases, from segmentary powers questio-
ning the state’s authority. Although violence used by other agents than the state is mostly
the domain of young men (to put it simply) in the United States (with the exception of the
South at certain periods) as well as in Latin America (though there were also other violent
actors including women), in the United States these young men tended to form separate
egalitarian groups and to found so-called “subcultures of violence” in the mining centers on
the frontier. These forms of violence appear to be the precursors of urban ethnic subcultures
of violence in North American cities after 1920 in several respects. Likewise the tradition of
individuals joining voluntary associations in order to safeguard their interests –a habit
which Max Weber also drew attention to– and to act on their own initiative and responsibi-
lity, thereby restricting the state’s power from the start, also had consequences for the orga-
nization of violence. Here “citizens” cooperated in vigilante groups united by the belief in
the individual’s social responsibility. In comparison violent actors in Latin America were
often (but not always) part of a hierarchical, client and clan oriented power structure repre-
senting local interests. Numerous violent actors in Latin America were so to speak “local
heroes” to begin with, although in a very limited way, because they were deprived of their
autonomy at the same time or were able to restore it only by withdrawing to geographic
border areas or to marginal social and cultural spaces and by organizing into gangs. 
Influential theories of society taking European developments as their model support
the argument that a society will become increasingly civilized when the state attains the
monopoly over physical violence. This view must be qualified in the case of the Ameri-
cas. In the United States the principle of individualism so firmly embedded in constitu-
tional and social thought and the general acceptance of the rule of law favored “civil”
structures of violence in the society and the economy, whereas in Latin America we find
a structure of violence whose character we can describe more accurately as segmentary.
This did not only result in the building up of violence between more or less equal anta-
gonists, as Norbert Elias has discussed in detail from the perspective of sociological the-
ory. Other than in the case of the so-called subcultures of violence in the United States
the state’s capability of influencing the control of violence was apparently limited to a
much larger degree by these segmentary structures in Latin America. They eventually
provoked the state –often a weak agent of violence among others –to act in an arbitrary
and uncontrolled way when it tried to extend its authority, supporting the diffusion and
transgression of violence “from above” by the excessive use of force. The state’s erratic
use of violence can be pursued to the present when tendencies toward liberalization lead
to limiting its civil functions on the one hand while at the same time expanding its repres-
sive capacities (Pereira/Davis 2000). Thus contrary to theoretical models even a tempo-
rarily “strong” state in Latin America had only a limited civilizing impact, because when
it held a monopoly of violence, as in periods of terrorist authoritarian regimes, it refused
its citizens any reliable protection against the arbitrary application of force. Therefore
the theoretical model which postulates the reduction of violence in the course of the
extension of the state’s power fits developments in Latin America only partially.
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When analyzing societies –and examining violence– the new social history has
employed the categories “above” and “below”. It was thus able to focus on social protest
movements, economically motivated unrest or various forms of state repression. It also
developed several theoretical models, like the theory of relative deprivation, behavior
and imitation approaches to violence, models of social exclusion, which are to provide
plausible explanations for the development of violence from the perspective of social
history (including allegedly the view from “below”). In close alliance with theories of
modernization social historical approaches have asked if violence increased or decreased
in the transition from “traditional” to modern societies. Equally fruitful is an approach,
however, which applies cultural theory models to the comparison of violence in the Uni-
ted States and Latin America, using the categories “internal” and “external”. This per-
spective illustrates that in the United States violence had a clear purpose, being directed
against “strangers”. Social and cultural hierarchical structures could be intimately invol-
ved, as is evident in the organization of racist motivated violence in the South of the Uni-
ted States. The significance of “the stranger” for the organization, legitimation and direc-
tion of violence probably also helps to account for the importance of ethnic resp. racial
as well as religious violence (Newton 1991). One example would be the phenomenon of
vigilantism which primarily resulted from ethnic, racial and religious conflict and was
directed against real or imagined minorities as well as against immigrants. This tradition
in the United States to link the legitimation of violence against “foreigners” to notions of
spatial as well as social and ethnic separation may account for the later occurrence of
ghettoization in North American towns. In Latin America on the other hand violence was
preferably applied in internal conflicts, from the war of independence against Spain
–which many Creoles saw as a “war between brothers” because of their close historical,
cultural and language ties– to the gang and “civil” wars of the present time. This under-
mined the state’s ability to control violence, to distance itself from society and to esta-
blish itself as a center of power in and of its own right.
This stronger tendency in the United States to direct violence against “external” groups
as against the application of violence in “internal” conflicts in Latin America helps to
explain characteristic differences of patterns of violence. For there was a noticeable predo-
minance of various forms of vigilantism, “Indian wars” and race riots in the United States
in the 19th century, whereas violence in Latin America was characterized by “civil wars”
(this term not always is very accurate to describe violent conflicts in sometimes more or
less stateless societies), rebellions, caudillo uprisings and gang wars. In order to avoid
misunderstanding, however, we must emphasize that no conclusions can be drawn as to
the amount of violence, ruthlessness, or cruelty applied in cases of violent conflict. Violent
ethnic or racial conflicts are characterized by a particularly ruthless use of force, holding
the opponent in contempt and prohibiting an impartial view. This is equally true, however,
of the internal resp. civil wars which can also be conducted in an especially intense way
–not least because of the spatial proximity and “mutual familiarity of the combatants”
which in turn force the protagonists to distance themselves from each other by using vio-
lence (Waldmann 1997: 484). In addition we have to take into account that similar violent
phenomena can have completely different origins. Thus the practice of arbitrary law in the
United States tends to derive from natural law and individualistic traditions of controlling
state power, whereas in Latin America it originates from a deep-seated distrust of the state
and its ability to administrate the social order properly and impartially.
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We have hardly addressed the relationship between violence and the economy in this
essay, although it should be submitted to much closer scrutiny. In the case of Latin Ame-
rica e.g. the question would be pertinent if the historically older forms of non-state sys-
tems of violence nowadays help to establish a new relationship between informality and
violence in illegal markets. For the purpose of rough orientation, violence can be divided
into violence which occurs in “closed” resp. in “open” economies (we adopt this dis-
tinction as made by Rufin 1999). In the first case the organization of violence is exclusi-
vely dependent upon utilizing local resources; therefore its potential for escalation is
limited from the beginning. In the second case resources and funds are supplied from
outside, the organization of violence is market oriented, in extreme cases it is completely
organized as a business, i.e. violence becomes a commodity resp. service to be sold. On
the basis of this distinction we can assume that in the 19th-century United States violence
usually occurred in “open” economic regions and in the context of commercial relations
because of the country’s greater economic potential and dynamics. A poignant folklori-
stic example is the figure of the highwayman who left the towns of the west coast for spo-
radic raids and attacks in the trans-Sierra frontier in order to enrich himself (McGrath
1984: 247 f.). In Latin America on the other hand we often find violent actors operating
in “closed” economic areas. The reasons for this difference were regional isolation, the
absence of supra-regional markets or low degrees of monetarization. Labor and property
conditions further facilitated the integration of violent actors in these closed economic
regions, because in Latin America –in contrast to the yeoman farmer in the United Sta-
tes– ranchers and land owners with large holdings were able to maintain armed clientilis-
tic forces with their own funds. In contrast, in those parts of the United States where
medium-sized farms dominated, violent actors could only organize on a voluntary basis,
e.g. into vigilante associations, which were, however, often tolerated by the state authori-
ties in the South. In Latin America economically isolated violent actors prevailed in
areas where subsistence economies and closed local economic systems predominated.
Their range was limited, however. If they acted beyond their local territory they were
dependent on additional proceeds in the long run, like the regionally based caudillos in
Peru who were paid by the large merchants in Lima (Gootenberg 1989: 107).
This comparison entails several methodological problems. It risks simply affirming
the familiar when trying to explain different developments of violence in the United Sta-
tes and Latin America by referring to more general political or social developments as
described in other historical studies. At the worst the comparison can reinforce research
stereotypes instead of demolishing them. For example, is the individualistic orientation
of violent actors in the United States which we have noticed perhaps the result of a spe-
cific “bourgeois” identity which we projected on the object of our inquiry ourselves? We
must also ask if such a comparison between the United States and Latin America should
be broken down into a comparison between different sub-phenomena, like the gamona-
lismo in the Andes region or the specific pattern of violence in the U.S. South. It may be
that general conclusions are too broad. Differences between urban and rural areas are
also important. In sum the greatest correspondence between violence in the United Sta-
tes and Latin America could be found in the more limited field of culturally motivated
patterns: The feeling of violated honor, rituals of masculinity, the transitions between
playful competition and violent acts –all these can be found on both continents. As the
impact of social change and institutional action on the organization and use of violence
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grew in the course of the 19th century, differences in the patterns of violence between the
United States and Latin America apparently widened as well.
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